

Typology of Verbal Violence in Political Discourse: Codification of Sociolinguistics

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Abstract-Use of language in the political world, especially during regional elections and heads of state almost loses control so that it represents verbal violence, such as provocation, insults, hate speech, etc. Therefore, this study aims to codify the typology of verbal violence in the political discourse of the 2017 DKI Regional Election and 2019 Presidential Election based on Sociolinguistic studies. This research uses a qualitative-descriptive approach and method *content analysis* and is based on typological work steps. Based on Sociolinguistics codified three typologies of the use of verbal violence in the political discourse of the DKI and Pilpres Regional Elections. *First*, based on his mission and motivation political, founded a type of verbal *hate speech* with four subtypes, namely (a) insults, (b) defamation, (c) provocation, and (d) incitement. *Second*, based on its social effects, three types of verbal violence were found namely (1) stigmatization, (2) labeling, and (3) stereotyping. *Third*, based on the form of delivery, found two types of verbal violence, namely (1) repressive with four subtypes: (a) threatening, (b) forcing, (c) yelling, (d) frightening, and (f) humiliating; and (2) an alienative type with two subtypes: (a) alienating and (b) discrediting. Based on the dominance of the data found on its political mission and motivation, which is *contempt* and *provocation*, the social effect is *stigmatization*, and based on repressive forms it is *humiliating* and alienative is *discrediting*; it can be concluded that the use of verbal violence in political discourse aims to beat, even bring down political opponents massively on the mass *online* media and social media, so that political language has lost its meaning and is far from politeness.

Keywords: verbal violence, typology, political discourse, sociolinguistics

Introduction

Lately verbal violence is not only found in personal or domestic life, but also found in political life. Based on the results of Juditha's research (2017), the use of verbal violence in the political sphere is already very alarming, especially the type of *hate speech* and influential on impoliteness in communication (Agustina, 2017). Very many expressions of verbal violence appear when approaching the leadership election, both regional elections and state elections. The rise of verbal violence in the country began since the events of the 2017 DKI Election which was triggered by a case of 'blasphemy' by one of the candidates for governor (Kurnia, 2018; Kustini and Putro, 2018). Indeed throughout history in the country, the 2017 DKI elections are the most excited, phenomenal, and controversial not only loaded with political content, but also have implications for the use of language as a political tool (Agustina, 2017). Even though the case has ended in court, the Regional Election has been completed, and the winner has been obtained, but the political events with chaos and confusion of information never ended, even sharper and massive during the 2019 Presidential Election.

The rampant use of violence was triggered by the availability of information technology facilities very easy and fast spread (Herawati, 2016; Husin, Febriyani, sunarti, 2018; Patihullah and Winarko, 2019). Based on the research results of David (2016), Ningrum, et al (2018) Wibowo (2018), Mufawiq, Sumarlam, & Kristina (2017) and Patihullah and Winarko, (2019) one of the quickest and easiest media to spread verbal violence is social media, especially *Facebook* and electronics. In this case, social media has changed its function, which initially functioned as a communication tool in cyberspace between communities has turned into a means of channeling verbal violence (Veronika and Widayatmoko, 2017; Ahmad, 2018).

Research on verbal violence has been done by previous researchers, including verbal violence the form of hate speech used by groups of immigrants (Brian & Joshua, 2004); in dialogue on Jewish-Palestinian diplomatic relations (Maoz, On, & Siham, 2007); verbal violence by adolescents (Arsih, 2010); verbal abuse by students (Rosidin, 2010); verbal violence in Kenya (Novi, 2011); verbal violence in traditional markets (Ambarwati, 2013), verbal violence on television (Azhar, 2015), *hate speech* on social media (Kurniawan, 2014), expressions of hatred by netizens on social media twitters (Burnap & Williams, 2015; Davidson, Warmsley, Macy & Weber, 2017; Wirawanda & Okta, 2018), hate speech in politic in Kenya (Makata, Onggarora, & Matu, 2016), and violence verbally in the discourse of DKI Election (Agustina, 2017). Although research on verbal violence has been done, typology of verbal violence specifically in political discourse has not been found. Therefore, this research needs to be done to codify the typology of verbal abuse in political discourse, especially discourse DKI

2017 and presidential elections, 2019. Thus, the novelty of this study lies in the typology of verbal abuse, which in this particular article based on the study of Sociolinguistics.

Methods

This study used a qualitative approach to data collection through indirect participant observation and documentation, and content analysis methods (*content analysis*) Miles and Huberman, and based on theory of Sociolinguistics; in this case the researcher is a key instrument that acts as a planner, executor of data collection, data analyzer, data interpreter, and reporter of research results.

The data of this study are sentences containing 'words or expressions of verbal violence' contained in the news, statements of politicians / political elites, and public comments about the 2017 DKI Pilkada and 2019 Presidential Election, which are sourced from (1) mass media news portals *online* (*CNN Indonesia, Kompas.com, DetikNews, WowKeren, Merdeka.com, Republika.co.id, Suara.com, Detik.com, Detik.finance, Liputan6.com, and Pinterpolitik.com*) which were published in January— April 2017 and September - April 2019; (2) social media, namely the account *Facebook @PilkadaDKI, FB AHY, FB Prabowo, FB Ahok, and FB Djarot*, which were published in January 2017. April 2017. The percentage of research results for each typology was obtained from the number of aspects found divided by the total data, then multiplied by one hundred (percent).

Results and Discussion

Typology of verbal violence in the political discourse of the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Election and the 2019 Presidential Election in this article were codified in three aspects of Sociolinguistics, namely (1) based on political motivation, (2) social effects, and (3) the form of delivery, with analysis results as follows.

Table 1. Typology of Verbal Violence in Political Discourse of 2017 DKI Regional Election and 2019 Presidential Election

Aspects Sociolinguistic	Regional Typology	Election of the 2017 DKI	Presidential Election 2019
1. Based on their mission and political motivation	Hate Speech		
	1. Insult	36 %	15 %
	2. Defame	6 %	6 %
	Defame	54 %	74 %
	3. Provoke	4 %	5 %
2. Based on social effects	4. Incite		
	Stigmatization	59 %	66 %
	Labeling	37 %	20 %
3. Based on the form of disclosure	Streotype	4 %	14. %
	Repressive		
	1. Threatening	1 %	---
	2. Forcing	8 %	6 %
	3. Screaming	15 %	14 %
	4. Scaring	7 %	16 %
	5. Embarrassing	69%	64%
	Alienative		
	1. Isolating	5 %	2 %
	2. Crediting	95 %	98 %

1.1. Typology of Verbal Violence Based on Political Motivation

Based on the political motivation of using verbal violence in the comments of politicians and the public about the 2017 DKI Pilkada and 2019 Presidential Election, found the type of hate speech (*hate speech*), namely words / writings that contain hatred towards a person / group that can trigger acts of violence and prejudice against the person / group in question. This type of hate speech can be divided into four categories (1) insulting, (2) defaming, (3) provoking, and (4) inciting.

Verbal violence type of hate speech category **insulting** can be seen in the following comments.

(1) Daripada si **Ahok tai, raja babi, raja mulut kotor, raja dajjal** (MS, BC: 19/2/17).

Instead of the Ahok tai, king of pigs, king of dirty mouths, king of the Antichrist (MS, BC: 19/2/17).

(2) Anies **mulutnya bau amis!! gak bener** ini orang (@stakastiki)

Anies has a fishy smell!! not really this person (@stakastiki)

- (3) Mereka **munafik**, bersorban, berkopiah putih tapi **munafik**. Kalau ada di detik terakhir fatwa ulama, kiai, habib melarang kita mencoblos Pak Jokowi, katakan kepada mereka, anda **munafik** (dN/HS/24/3/2019).
*They are **hypocritical**, turbaned, wearing white but **hypocritical**. If there is a fatwa on the ulama, scholars, kiai, habib forbid us from voting for Mr. Jokowi, tell them you are a **hypocrite** (dN / HS / 24/3/2019).*
- (4) Jokowi **babu China Presiden terg***ok di dunia. D***ok, blo**on, id**t**. Bbu China, PKI. Takut-takut amat bela Allah, emang dia PKI (Pilih Prabowo. (Wk/6/4/2019).
*Jokowi **babu China President is the best in the world. D *** ok, blo ** on, id ** t**. Chinese mother, PKI. Fearful of defending Allah, he was a PKI (Choose Prabowo. (Wk / 6/4/2019).*

Hate speech of hatred for contempt for the data was conveyed through the expressions of insults *the pig lover's, the basis of pigs* in the data (1) and *tai, the king of pigs. king filthy mouth, the king of Antichrist* on the data (2), and the expression of defamation *hypocritical* data (3), as well as an expression of humiliation and insults *babu china, president tergoblok, whacky, idiot, pig Chinese* data (4).

Violence verbal type of hate speech categories **libel** can be seen in the following example comments.

- (5) **Kaum konservatif radikal** bersatu di sekeliling Anis Sandi & keduanya nyaman dengan ini. Bisa karena kesamaan ide politik atau asal nemplok (RM, BS:13/3/17).
***Radical conservatives** unite around Anis Sandi & both are comfortable with this. Could be due to the similarity of political ideas or the origin of nemplok (RM, BS: 13/3/17).*
- (6) Jadi mentri dipecat. Sekarang ngarep turun derajat napsu nyalonin gubernur. Kayaknya bapak Anis **mabuk jabatan**. Ane doain gak jadi. Amin (MS,NW:30/1/17).
*So the minister is fired. Now it is down to the governor's nomination. Looks like Mr Anis was **drunk on his post**. I pray not finished. Amen (MS, NW: 1/30/17).*
- (7) Halo media. Ini media, lo ke sini mau liput acara atau **nunggu gue salah ngomong?** (Sc/Pbw/28/3/2019).
*Hello media. This is the media, do you want to report here or **wait for me to say the wrong thing?** (Sc / Pbw / 28/3/2019).*
- (8) Metro TV memberitakan bahwa **pak Prabowo ditinggal pendukungnya**. Bagi kami ini framing yang jahat yang dilakukan Metro TV memberikan kampanye hitam ke pak Prabowo dan juga kami semua pendukung pak Prabowo di Sumbar (Mc/An/5/4/2019).
*Metro TV reported that **Pak Prabowo was left by his supporters**. For us this evil framing carried out by Metro TV gave a black campaign to Pak Prabowo and also we are all supporters of Mr. Prabowo in West Sumatra (Mc / An / 5/4/2019).*

In data (5), defamation is expressed through the phrases *of radical conservatives*, in data (6) using the composite *motion sickness*, in data (7) through clauses *waiting I am wrong talking*, whereas in data (8) defamation is marked by the clause of *Mr. Prabowo left by his supporters*.

Types of hate speech categories **provoking** can be seen in the following comments.

- (9) Iya beener dan nyata semenjak ahok menjabat GUBERNUR DKI, **KEUTUHAN NKRI ANCURRR**...buat ahoker gak usah bales comment saya, percuma lieurr **hukumcarut marut** (MS,IBL:23/01/17).
*Yes, you have been a true and real person since Ahok has served as the Governor of DKI Jakarta, **THE UNITY OF ANCURRR NKRI**... make ahoker don't need to reply to my comment, it's useless lieurr **lawchaotic** (MS, IBL: 01/17/17).*
- (10) **Hanya orang bodoh** yang masih mendukung Anies. Ahok non muslim, coba dia muslim ga mungkin menghina agama sendiri. Tolol (MS,AH:2/3/17).
***Only fools** still support Anies. Ahok non-Muslims, try to be Muslim it is impossible to insult your own religion. Foolish (MS, AH: 2/3/17).*
- (11) Kubu 02 merupakan tempat berkumpulnya pendukung **ekstremis, radikal, hingga teroris** (PP/SAS/23/3/2019).
*Kubu 02 is a gathering place for supporters of **extremists, radicals and terrorists** (PP / SAS / 23/3/2019).*
- (12) Karena banyak (pemilik lahan) yang nakal-nakal bukan orang miskin, itu orang-orang kaya yang **ngerampok kita** (Sl/Js/24/3/2019).
*Because many (landowners) who are delinquents are not poor people, it is **therich people who rob us** (Sl / Js //24/3/2019).*

Hatred in the data above provoke the reader not to like or choose objects / target referred to in the text, i.e., in data (9) through the phrase the *integrity of the NKRI ancurrr, chaotic law*; in data (10) provocation using clauses *only stupid people (fools) who support Anis*, in data (11) provocation to the reader is done through clause *02 of extremist, radicalist and terrorist camps*.

Next, type speechhatred **inciting** can be seen in the following example.

- (13) Pilih pemimpin yang waras jangan pilih **pemimpin pendongeng** (MS,MS:9/4/17).
Choose a sane leader, don't choose a storyteller leader (MS, MS: 9/4/17).
- (14) Ingat jangan dukung dan pilih calon yg didukung oleh partai pendukung **penista agama**, biar kita tidak dijauhi pertolongan Allah karna meraka hanya peduli kekuasaan bukan keadilan (MS,YN:23/04/17)
Remember do not support and choose candidates who are supported by parties supporting religious dissidents, so that we are not shunned by God's help because they only care about power not justice (MS, YN: 23/04/17)
- (15) Saya terima kasih mendapat sambutan luar biasa dari masyarakat NTB. **Kalau elite di Jakarta tidak suka sama Prabowo** karena mereka **nyolong uang rakyat**. Karena itu, mereka tidak suka. **Saya pun muak dengan mereka**. Lebih baik saya kunjungan ke daerah (Mc/Pbw7/4/2019).
I thank you for being welcomed outside ordinary from the people of NTB. Elites in Jakarta don't like Prabowo because they help public money. Because of this, they don't like it. I was fed up with them. I better visit to the area (Mc / Pbw7 / 4/2019).
- (16) Saya bicara setelah mengikuti perkembangan penghitungan suara dari tadi, kita prihatin dari tadi malam **banyak kejadian yang merugikan pendukung 02** (Wk/Pbw/17/4/2019).
I speak after following the vote count development earlier, we are concerned from last night that there were many events that harmed supporters 02 (Wk / Pbw / 17/4/2019).

The hate speech contained in the data above illustrates the incitement to the reader not to choose or trust the person or party referred to in the text. In data (13) incitement is marked by the use of imperative clauses of forbidding *do not select storytellers leaders*, as well as incitement to data (14) through the imperative prohibition clause *do not choose parties supporting religious insults*. Furthermore, in data (15) utterances of incitement hatred use a declarative complex clause *If the elite in Jakarta do not like Prabowo because theynyolong public money and I'm fed up with them*; whereas in data (16) the incitement of hate speech through declarative compound clauses *we are concerned from last night many events that harm supporters 02*.

1.2. Typology of Verbal Violence Based on Social Effects

Based on **the social effects of the** use of verbal violence in the political discourse of the 2017 DKI Regional Election and 2019 Presidential Election, three types of verbal violence typology were found, namely (1) stigmatization, (2) labeling, and (3) stereotypes.

Verbal violence type of **stigmatization** can be seen in the following example comments.

- (17) Tatapan matanya menyimpan **kelicikan**. Silahkan menikmati jaman era SBY, duit banyak keluar tapi pada mangkrak. Mudah2an ingat kerja SBY hanya buat **rumah hantu di hambalang**(MS,AT:3/2/17).
Her eyes save cunning. Please enjoy the era of SBY era, a lot of money came out but it was stalled. Hopefully SBY's work is only for a haunted house in Hambalang (MS, AT: 3/2/17).
- (18) Pilkada DKI membuktikansisi gelap agama. Betapa jahatnya **agama yang dipolitisasi (politisasi agama)**. Betapa jahatnya orang-orang beragama (RM,I:14/3/17).
DKI regional election proves the dark side of religion. How evil is politicized religion (politicization of religion). How evil religious people are (RM, I: 14/3/17).
- (19) Yg seharusnya memang seorang pemimpin harus berkorban, jgn kaya yg lain **cuma janji** ...itupun belum tentu ditepati, yglain hanya **pembohong besar**contoh kayanya hanya Ahok yg berani berkorban yg lain yg di gedein korupsi aja . (MS,SS:28/02/17)
What should be a leader must make sacrifices, don't let other people just promise ... and that's not necessarily true, others are just big liars ... for example, it is only Ahok who dares to sacrifice others who are only willing to corroborate. (MS,SS: 02/28/17)
- (20) Pemerintah jangan sampai **mengada-ada**. Kecuali jika memang betul-betul ada isu yang menyebar berisi ancaman kekerasan. Beberapa kali pemerintah melalui statemnya justru memperlihatkan **pembuat hoax** adalah pemerintah sendiri. Misalnya, soal tidak adanya kebakaran hutan, padahal jelas ada, dst. Kita anti dengan hoax, termasuk hox yang mungkin dibuat oleh pemerintah sendiri (Sk/21/3/2019).

*The government should not **make it up**. Unless there really is a rumor that spreads the threat of violence. Several times the government through its statement actually shows **the hoax maker** is the government itself. For example, about the absence of forest fires, when in fact there are, etc. We are against with hoaxes, including hox which may be made by the government itself (Sk / 21/3/2019).*

Verbal violence contained in the data in the form of stigmatization, which is a negative thing attached to a person because of the influence of the environment and certain conditions. In data (17) verbal violence in the form of stigmatization is aimed at certain pairs which are revealed through *cunning*, in data (18) stigma of *religious politicization* as a marker of DKI Regional Election, then in data (19) stigma uses the phrase *only promises and a big liar* for one of the candidate for governor, while in the data (20) the stigma is *far-fetched* and *hoak makers* are directed at the government, as if the government itself is making hoaks.

Verbal violence **labeling** can be observed in the following sample comments.

- (21) Buat seluruh warga Jakarta tolong jangan pilih Ahok karena **dia kafir** (MS,IB:20/1/17).
*For all Jakarta citizens, please do not choose Ahok because **he is an infidel** (MS, IB: 1/20/17).*
- (22) **Tukang jilat**. Waktu non blok bacotin Jokowi, waktu dipilih jadi menteri bacotin Prabowo. Sekarang dipilih jadi cagub oleh Gerindra muji setinggi langit si Prabowo. Yakin pilih si **tukang jilat** mas mbak? (MS,BB:1/4/17).
***Lickers**. When non-block Bacin Jokowi, when he was elected as Minister Bacacin Prabowo. Now chosen as cagub by Gerindra muji as high as the Prabowo sky. Are you sure you choose the **licker**, bro? (MS, BB: 1/4/17).*
- (23) Kalau ada habaib, kiai, ulama yang bilang haram pilih Jokowi, itu tidak perlu diikuti, mereka **munafik!** Mau fasilitas Pak Jokowi, tapi tidak mau pilih Jokowi (dN/HS/24/3/2019).
*If there is a habaib, kiai, ulama who say it is haram, choose Jokowi, it does not need to be followed, they are **hypocrites!** Want the facilities of Mr. Jokowi, but do not want to choose Jokowi (dN / HS / 24/3/2019).*
- (24) Jokowi **babu China** Presiden terg***ok di dunia.D***ok, **blo**on, id**t**. Pilih Prabowo. Bbu China, PKI. Takut-takut amat bela Allah, emang dia PKI (Wk/6/4/2019).
*Jokowi **babu China** President is the best in the world.D *** ok, **blo ** on, id ** t**. Choose Prabowo. Chinese mother, PKI. Afraid of defending Allah, he is a PKI (Wk / 6/4/2019).*

Verbal violence in the data is verbal violence in the form of labeling, which is to give a bad label (title) to the intended person in the text. In data (21) labeling of *infidels* is addressed to one of the candidates for governor, in data (22) labeling of *lick money* is also aimed at other candidates for governor. Then in the data (23) labeling is *hypocritical* addressed to people who say it is forbidden to choose Jokowi, while in the data (24) labeling is *blocked, stupid, idiot* addressed to presidential candidate 01 openly and massively on social media.

Type verbal violence **Stereotype** can also be seen in the following sample comments.

- (25) Jika saya kalah itu berarti **dicurangi** (GP, 18/4/17).
*If I lose it mean **rigged** (GP, 18/04/17).*
- (26) Hanya **kecurangan** yang bisa memenangkan anies sandi(PK, 15/4/17).
*Only **cheating** can win password anies(PK, 4/15/17).*
- (27) Maaf Pak Jokowi, karena Pak Jokowi ini sahabat saya, jadi saya ini pembantu bapak pak, banyak yang kasih **keterangan** (pada bapak) yang menurut saya tidak tepat, **menyesatkan** (dN/Pbw/30/3/2019).
*Sorry, Mr. Jokowi, because Mr. Jokowi is my best friend, so I am your assistant, sir, many of whom give **information** (to the father) that I think is incorrect, **misleading** (dN / Pbw / 30/3/2019).*
- (28) Saya berpandangan bahwa **negara sedang sakit** (Mc/Pbw/9/4/2019).
*I am of the view that the **country is sick** (Mc / Pbw / 9/4/2019).*

Verbal violence in the data is included in the stereotype category, namely in the form of assumptions, the personal prejudices of speakers who are subjective and imprecise about the things mentioned in the text. Verbal violence in all three data is a personal negative assumption of the speaker and is insinuating towards the person or parties referred to by using stereotypes *rigged* (25), and *only fraud* (26), misleading information (27), and the State is ill on the data (26).

1.3. Typology of Verbal Violence Based on the Form of Disclosure

Based on its **form of opinion**, the thology of verbal violence in the political discourse of the 2017 DKI Regional Election and 2019 Presidential Election was codified in two types, namely (1) repressive and (2) alienative.

Types **Repressive** are verbal violence that has implications for suppression, restraint, detention and oppression. Based on research data, this repressive type can be divided into five subtypes, namely (1) threatening, (2) forcing, (3) yelling, (4) frightening, and (5) embarrassing.

Repressive verbal violence **threatening** can be observed in the following comments.

- (29) Silahkan Anda jadikan Ahok sebagai nabi kalian. Tapi **jangan sekali-sekali nodai Islam dan perjuangan Umat Islam**. Atau **kamu akan kami habisi dengan cara kami** (DF3:1/4/17).
Please make Ahok your prophet. But do not occasionally stigmatize Islam and the struggle of Muslims. Or we will kill you our way (DF3: 1/4/17).
- (30) **Siapa** yang berusaha **merongrong NKRI, berhadapan dengan kami** (PK, 4/4/17).
Who is trying to undermine the Republic of Indonesia, dealing with us (PK, 4/4/17).

Repressive verbal violence contained in the data in the form of threats to parties mentioned in the text. In the data (29) the threat is aimed at *people / parties who desecrate Islam and the struggle of the Muslims* with your threat *we will kill in our way*, while in the data (30) the threat is aimed at *people who are trying to undermine the Republic of Indonesia* with threats *facing us*.

Verbal violence type of **repressive** category **force** can be seen in the following example.

- (31) Yang merasa orang muslim **jangan memilih Ahok**, pilihlah yang seiman (MS,RK:5/1/17).
Those who feel Muslims do not choose Ahok, choose those who believe (MS, RK: 5/1/17).
- (32) Rakyat cerdas **pasti pilih orang yang baik**; yang terbukti bersih, jujur, marakyat, berani, kompeten dan sederhana (RM,AW:8/2/17)
Smart people must choose good people; who is proven to be clean, honest, powerful, brave, competent and simple (RM, AW: 8/2/17)
- (33) Moga Ahok **mati bunuh diri, amiin** (MS,JL:24/01/17)
Moga Ahok dies of suicide, amma (MS,JL: 24/01/17)
- (34) Bodo amat, kafir! **Penjarakan Ahok!** (MS,SY:20/1/17)
Bodo is very, infidel! Imprison Ahok! (MS, SY: 20/1/17)

Repressive verbal violence in the comments is categorized as coercive, namely requiring people / communities to do what is mentioned in the text even if they don't like it. In the data (31) coercion using the allusions must be mandatory through a fenced imperative clause *who feel Muslims, do not choose Ahok, but the choice of believers*; with the implication that only those who are non-Muslim can choose Ahok. In data (32), coercion using the imperative clause of certainty fenced by *smart people must choose a good person*, with the implication that it is fools who do not follow the coercion. On the other hand, on data 32, coercion is done more subtly praying through the contradictory clause of *hope that Ahok will kill himself*, while on data (33) coercion is done through imperative sentences calling *Ahok Prison*, which represents that the order must be carried out.

Here is an example of the type of verbal violence repressive snapped.

- (35) **Bego!** Emangnya dia yang punya duit ngebenerin? **Pake otak dong** (MS,BC:20/1/17).
Idiot! Is he the one who has the money to generate? Use your brain (MS, BC: 1/20/17).
- (36) **Bodo amat, kafir!** Penjarakan Ahok! (MS,SY:20/1/17)
Very stupid, infidel! Imprison Ahok! (MS, SY: 20/1/17)
- (37) **Kaya harta, jabatan mulia, masih terima suap. Tak bisa berkata apa-apa menanggapi, selain kata: Serakah !!** (RM,MP:27/1/17)
Rich in wealth, position noble, still accepting bribes. Can't say anything in response to that, other than the word: Greedy !! (RM, MP: 27/1/17)

Verbal violence on data (35) is carried out through verbal abuse with the aim of yelling at the person / party referred to in the text, with insulting insults, that is, *stupid, using the brain* in the data (35), and *bodo is very infidel* in data (36).

Verbal abuserepressive type **scare** can be seen in the following comments.

- (38) Kubu 02 merupakan tempat berkumpulnya pendukung **ekstremis, radikal, hingga teroris** (PP/SAS/23/3/2019).
Kubu 02 is a gathering place for supporters of extremists, radicals and terrorists (PP / SAS / 23/3/2019).
- (39) Kini, menjelang Pilpres 2019, kekuatan **Islam konservatif** ini disinyalir melabuhkan dukungan untuk mendukung Prabowo-Sandi (PP/SAS/23/3/2019).
Now, approaching the 2019 presidential election, power conservative Islamic this has allegedly anchored support for supporting Prabowo-Sandi (PP / SAS / 23/3/2019).

The repressive verbal violence contained in the data aims to frighten the reader about what is conveyed in the text. In the data (38-39) scare people with extreme statements that *in camp 02 contains supporters of extremists, radicals, to terrorists*; and on data (39) as *conservative Islam*.

Repressive verbal violence **humiliates**, including the following.

- (40) 75% milih duitnya Ahok itu betul sekali. Kalau milih sifat dan wataknya nggak lah yau. Keringatnya aja bau **bangkai babi, lho**. Coba dekatin Ahok. **Amis banget baunya**. Mungkin dulunya Ahok banyak makan **uang haram**(MS,AS:3/2/17).
75% of Ahok's money is very correct. If you choose the nature and character is not sure. Just sweat it smells of dead pig, you know. Try approaching Ahok. Very fishy smell. Maybe Ahok used to eat a lot of haram money (MS, USA: 3/2/17).
- (41) Dari Senayan sampai Istana, **berjejer Tukang Orba**. Sambung *menyambung* menjadi satu, itulah kemunafikkan (RM, RG:16/3/17).
From the Senayan to the Palace, lined with Orbiter. Connect continued to be one, that's hypocrisy (RM, RG: 16/3/17) ..
- (42) Sikap reaktif yang ditunjukkan Pak Jokowi akhir-akhir ini menunjukkan beliau masih **jauh dari kapasitas sebagai seorang negarawan**. Justru sikap ini telah memicu ketegangan baru ditengah-tengah masyarakat (dN/HR/24/3/2019).
The reactive attitude shown by Mr. Jokowi lately shows he is still far from his capacity as a statesman. It is precisely this attitude that has triggered new tensions in the midst of society (dN / HR / 24/3/2019).

Repressive verbal violence contained in all three data aims to embarrass the intended party so that they feel displeased, despicable, and lowly. In the data (41) by insulting through the phrase *carcasses of pigs, very fishy smells, and haram money*; in data (42) with the word *artisan*, while in data (43) using the word *degrading is far from the capacity as a statesman*.

Furthermore, verbal violence in the 2017 DKIElection and 2019 Presidential Election **Regional discourse** is found in two subtypes, namely (1) alienating / isolating and (2) discrediting.

Alienative verbal **alienation / isolation** is found in the following example.

- (43) Yang merasa orang muslim **jangan memilih Ahok**, pilihlah yang seiman (MS,RK:5/1/17).
Those who feel Muslims don't choose Ahok, choose the brethren (MS, RK: 5/1/17).
- (44) Buat seluruh warga Jakarta tolong **jangan pilih Ahok karena dia kafir**(MS,IB:20/1/17).
For all Jakarta citizens, please do not choose Ahok because he is an infidel (MS, IB: 1/20/17).
- (45) Pemimpin yang tidak memiliki visi berkelanjutan **NO WAY!!!** (Ss/21/3/2019) ‘
Leaders who do not have a sustainable vision NO WAY !!! (Ss /21/3/2019)) ‘

Alienative verbal violence in the data aims to alienate, exclude, or reject the intended party in the text through the imperative prohibition clause *do not choose Ahok* in the data (43-44), while in the data (45) exclusion or rejection is conveyed through the expression of a prohibition *no way* for leaders who do not have a sustainable vision.

Furthermore, the verbal violence alienation category **discredit** can be seen in the following example.

- (49) **Kaum-kaum munafik** disini pada ngumpul. Silahkan kalian pilih si Ahok (MS,AN:19/4/17)..
The hypocrites here at gathering. Please choose the Ahok (MS, AN: 4/19/17) ...
- (50) Ahok bagaikan **pedang bermata dua** yg mampu menusuk jantung hati dan merobek pola politik sampai hancur berkeping karna sikafir yg bijak . (MS,OL:22/04/17).
Ahok is like a double-edged sword that can pierce the heart of the heart and tearing political patterns to shreds because of wise sikafir. (MS, OL: 4/22/17).
- (51) Kalau nanti terjadi kecurangan, kita nggak akan **ke MK** (Mahkamah Konstitusi). **Nggak ada gunanya**, tapi kita people power, people power sah (dN/AR/31/3/2019)].
If there is fraud later, we will not go to the Constitutional Court (Constitutional Court). It's no use, but we are people power, legitimate people power (dN / AR / 31/3/2019)].
- (52) Kubu Prabowo terus membangun skenario curang termasuk tuduhan adanya intervensi negara. Semua skenario kalap akibat survei Prabowo-Sandi yang semakin tertekan. Mereka biasa **menghalalkan segala cara, dimulai hoaks, fitnah, skenario curang, politisasi agama, hingga teori konspirasi buta** (Mc/Hs/5/4/2019).
Kubu Prabowo continues to develop fraudulent scenarios including accusations of state intervention. All the scenarios were frantic due to the Prabowo-Sandi survey which was

increasingly depressed. They used to justify any means, starting with hoaks, slander, cheating scenarios, religious politicization, and blind conspiracy theories (Mc / Hs / 5/4/2019).

Alienative verbal violence discredits the data (49), that is, *hypocrites are* directed at Muslims who support or are on party A, and on data (50) thesatire idiom *double-edged sword* discredits A which is called a pattern tear political. Furthermore, in data 51 crediting is marked by the use of a negative declarative clause *of no use(to MK)*, addressed to the Constitutional Court as a law enforcement agency, while the data (52) reducing characters by multiple simultaneous expression *justifies allmeans, start hoaks, defamatory, fraudulent scenario, the politicization of religion, to the conspiracy theory* blindaddressed to the party mentioned in the text.

Discussion

Based on the results of the codification of three typologies of verbal violence in the 2017 DKI Election and 2019 Presidential Election discourse, namely based on (1) political motivation, (2) social effects, and (3) forms of verbal violence, the three typology findings are discussed as follows. *First*, based on the findings of four types of hate speech, namely (1) insults (36.30% and 15.27%), (2) defamation (5.73% and 5.55%), (3) provocation (54.14% and 66.66%), and (4) incitement (3.82% and 5.55%) as a typology of verbal violence over political motivation in the discourse of the DKI Jakarta Pilkada and the 2019 Presidential Election, apparently the most dominant use was propocation and humiliation . That is, in both discourses there is the same political motivation, which is equally provoking or influencing the reader or the public of the mission it conveys in the text, as well as by insulting the opposing parties or unwanted ones through statements and comments in the online mass media and social media. The use of these two types of hate speech has implications for the desecration of political language, which should be soothing and pleasant, so that it switches to being a language of hate.

Second, based on the findings of three typologies of verbal violence on **the social effects that caused**, namely stigmatization (58.59% and 66.66%), labeling (37.57% and 19.69%), and stereotyping (3.82% and 13.63%), it turns out that the dominant type is stigmatized, then labeling, and finally stereotyping. The stigmatization is aimed at giving or displaying negative things to the person/party mentioned in the text so that it indirectly influences the reader or the community of contesting candidates. This means that verbal violence built up in the two political discourses both have a negative social effect on competing candidates or candidates. Again, the use of negative stigmatization and labeling in the two political discourses has implications for the function of political language, which should have a positive influence on turning into a language that presents negative information about each candidate whose truth is not necessarily true.

Third, based on the findings of two typologies of verbal violence over the **form of its delivery**, namely (1) four repressive types: threatening (0.63% and 1.51%), forcing (7.64% and 6.06%), shouting (14, 64% and 13.63%), frightening (7.00% and 16.66%), and embarrassing (68.15% - 65.15%) apparently the dominant ones used were humiliation and shouting; and (2) alienative types, that is alienating (5.16% and 1.51%) and discrediting (94.83% and 98.48%), apparently the dominant type found is the discrediting type. That is, in both discourses political issues that are exposed to the dominant are expressed in a hard way, not only delivered with an objective shouting and crediting, but have arrived at a repressive level humiliating the competing parties or candidates. The implication of using language with that goal is to damage the function of political language, which is to turn into a means of expressing emphasis, intimidation, and crediting. The findings of these three typologies are very simultaneous and interconnected (reciprocal), that is when political discourse is expressed with hate motivation, it will give birth to statements and comments that are provocative; and triggering the formation of negative stigmatization as an effect or social impact on the person / party to be addressed so that it leads to repressive and alienative statements.

The widespread use of verbal violence in the political sphere lately, especially during regional or state head elections, is actually an impact of *freedom of expression* excessive (Lesmana, 2018), especially in cyberspace. It seems that this freedom is what triggers politicians and the public to choose digital mass media (*online*) and social media as a place to give statements and comments related to the political problems of the DKI and Pilpres elections. However, in reality they seem to lose control of language so that news that is spread and status written have become public consumption containing expressions of hatred, stigmatization, repressive and alienative, according to Mangantibe (2016) included in criminal acts. In this study, the use of verbal violence by politicians and the public tends to denigrate and blaspheme the candidates they dislike, with the aim of provoking the reader to believe what he is saying. In fact, it aims to insult, blaspheme, terrorize, threaten, force, yell, frighten, and embarrass the parties mentioned in the text. This is in line with research conducted by Noh & Talat, (2012), Virgina & Olanrewaju (2017), and Sinaga (2019).

The results of this study are relevant to Juditha's research (2017), Sutantohadi (2017), Agustina, (2017), Nithaqaini (2018), Pangestika, et al. (2018), Azhar (2015), Kurniawan (2014), Mawarti (2018), Ningrum,

Suryadi & Wardhana (2018), David (2016), Septanto (2018), and Sinaga (2019) that verbal violence in political language is generally spread through online mass media and social media and aims to blaspheme, insult, reproach the intended person in the text. In fact, political language that contains verbal violence not only occurs in Indonesia but also in other countries, including based on the results of research conducted by Bleich (2011); Burnap & Williams (2015); Makata, Onggarora, & Matu (2016), Davidson, Warmlesley, Macy, Weber, (2017); Rasak, et.al (2017); and Pejhal (2018).

Conclusion

Based on the results of research and discussion, it can be concluded that verbal violence typology in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Election discourse and 2019 Presidential Election discourse. Based on the **mission and motivation** political, it is dominated by the use of provocation and hate speech utterances; based on **its social effects** is dominated by stigmatization, while based on the **form of its expression** repressive humiliating and alienative discredit.

Socially, political language contains certain missions carried by each of the institutions and political constituents who contest, so that the text (oral/written) which is used linguistically is more on the type of persuasion (positive). But in reality in the 2017 DKI Election and 2019 Presidential Election discourse, the dominant type used is negative persuasion so that based on political motivation it produces provocative hate speech, triggers the formation of negative stigmatization, and results in repressive and alienative statements. This is because the exposure of political missions is based on arguments tinged with political cynicism.

In this connection, the political language in the two discourses has lost its true function as a language that should be soothing and exhilarating in the party of democracy, but deviates into an arena for spreading hatred, spreading negative stigma, and repressive and alienative actions so that it has the potential to trigger divisions and hostility in democracy. in the midst of democratic life. In this case, political language has lost its meaning because it has been manipulated and engineered for the interests of political elites and certain groups of society.

Reflecting on the use of verbal violence in political language in the 2017 Jakarta Election and 2019 Presidential Election discourse, it seems that it is necessary to immediately consider the rules of language use in election or campaign periods. KPU and Bawaslu as well as other relevant agencies that are authorized, should provide clear guidelines on the use of language during the campaign period. Thus, the code of ethics for the use of language in the period of the Regional Head Election, Pileg, and Presidential Election must be immediately formulated so that political language is more democratic and educative.

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