CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Concepts and Issues

Edited by

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To the memory of

Mr. Norio Furushima
Japan Foundation Asia Center, Tokyo, Japan

and

Prof. J.M. Nathan
National Institute of Education
Nanyang Technical University, Singapore

*Both of these distinguished persons were important partners in the
initiatives that led to this book, but to our great sadness and regret,
they are not here to see the fruition of our collective efforts.*

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List of Abbreviations

ACCES	Asia-Pacific Network for Citizenship Education in the Schools
BP-7	Board to Promote Education Implementing the Guide to Pancasila
CCE	Centre for Citizenship Education
CDC	Curriculum Development Council
CDC	Curriculum Development Committee
CEPS	Citizenship Education Policy Study
CME	Civics and Moral Education
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
EPA	Economic and Public Affairs
GCS	Global Concerns Study
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHQ	General Headquarters
GNP	Gross National Product
GPA	Government and Public Affairs
HKAL	Hong Kong Advanced Level
HKIEd	Hong Kong Institute of Education
HKSAR	Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
HMI	Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Muslim Students' Association)
IAIN	Institut Agama Negeri Islam (State Institute for Islamic studies)
ICTs	Information Communication Technologies
IEA	International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
KMT	Kuomintang (Nationalist Party)
MOE	Ministry of Education
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Council)
NCSS	National Council for the Social Studies
NE	National Education
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NICT	National Institute for Compilation and Translation
NPTA	Native Place Teaching Activities
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Association of Muslim Scholars)
PAP	People's Action Party
PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle)
PGDE	Postgraduate Diploma in Education
PPKN	Pendidikan Pancasila dan Kewarganegaraan (Pancasila and Citizenship Education)
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
SCNU	South China Normal University
SS	Social Studies

Series Editor's Foreword

It is a great pleasure to present this book, edited by a distinguished team at the Hong Kong Institute of Education and with excellent contributors from nine countries in the region and beyond. The book is a truly comparative work which significantly advances conceptual understanding. The comparisons undertaken are at many levels and with different units for analysis. One chapter undertakes comparison in two cities (Hong Kong and Guangzhou), three chapters make comparisons between two countries (South Korea and Singapore; Solomon Islands and Vanuatu; South Korea and China); and five chapters undertake comparisons across the whole region. Other chapters focus on individual countries or, in one case, on a single school. In addition, several chapters examine the attitudes and roles played by individuals and groups within societies. The book is thus an admirable example of the vitality of the field of comparative education in selecting different units for analysis and in examination of issues from diverse angles.

Within the book, moreover, readers will find a fascinating array of settings and environments. On the one hand, for example, is Japan with its relatively homogenous culture, a population of 126 million, and a strong national identity based on language and history. On the other hand is Solomon Islands, which has a population of just 400,000 scattered over 1,000 islands, approximately 90 indigenous languages, and major social problems arising from culture clashes, economic forces, political dynamics and legacies of colonialism. Between these two extremes are multiple religious, political, social and economic contexts which provide a fertile arena for the work of scholars in the field of comparative education.

Also worth noting is the way in which the book builds on existing volumes in the series CERC Studies in Comparative Education. Readers will find explicit reference to the volumes on education and political transition and on values education for dynamic societies. The series has made a particular contribution to the study of education in Asia and the Pacific, and CERC is delighted to add this very significant book to the growing collection.

Mark Bray
Chair Professor of Comparative Education
Dean, Faculty of Education
The University of Hong Kong

Introduction

David L. Grossman

While the threads that formed the path to this book have been multi-faceted and complex, the starting point is clear. It originates from a dialogue about the potential for Asia-Pacific values and traditions to contribute to the development of more democratic societies, and whether selected aspects of these values and traditions can be harnessed for democratic citizenship education. The complicating fact is that nearly every significant term in the previous sentence can be contested, e.g., Asian values, traditions, democratic, and citizenship education. Even the term Asia-Pacific region is contested, for that matter, as Dirlik (1992) reminds us, because we construct and deconstruct our geographical images as well.

Of course the larger context is one of multiple modernities which within them often include multiple democratic projects. Like Tu (1998), we look at modernisation not as homogenizing and linear, but as a process that can assume different cultural forms. Within these cultural forms, there is the potential for the development of democratic systems and democratic citizenship, but in formats that are often hybrids of local, regional, and global patterns. Through a process of dialogue we hoped to identify and analyse a number of these formats. We need to emphasise the concept of dialogue here, as opposed to debate. The purpose of debate is to win an argument, to beat your opponent. Dialogue is about exploring common ground. According to Yankelovich (1999), there are three distinctive features that differentiate dialogue from discussion or other forms of talk: equality among participants, empathetic listening, and surfacing assumptions non-judgmentally.

Encouragement of dialogue among scholars in the Asia-Pacific region about the nature of citizenship education was central to the development of this book. Here we can make two observations. First, there has been a growing discussion within the region's societies about citizenship, civic education and related topics, especially within those societies in some form of political transition. Second, we note at the same time that there has been very much less cross-national discussion of these same topics, or participation within 'international' programmes. Only one Asian society (Hong Kong), for example, participated in the 1999 International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) survey and study of civic education.

To my colleague W. O. Lee and myself, these conditions represented a significant opportunity as well as a problem. In the midst of the dramatic transition of Hong Kong back to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and the political issues surrounding it, it seemed to us that we might capitalise on the Hong Kong situation as a catalyst to encourage a regional dialogue about citizenship education. In 1998 we proposed the

creation of a Centre for Citizenship Education as an 'Area of Excellence' within the Hong Kong Institute of Education (HKIEd) with a mission to serve not just Hong Kong but the larger region as a locus for cross-national dialogue about citizenship education. This idea was supported with seed money from HKIEd, and a design for such a Centre was prepared using a wide-ranging consultation process involving local and international scholars. At the same time we sought and successfully received from the Japan Foundation Asia Center a grant for the development of a regional network for dialogue on citizenship education, the Asia-Pacific Network for Citizenship Education in the Schools, or ACCES.

In February 1999, we held a joint event to celebrate both the opening of the Centre for Citizenship Education (CCE) at HKIEd, and the first convening of an ACCES meeting, in which there were more than 40 participants. There were two subsequent meetings of the ACCES network, both held in Thailand, in December 1999 and December 2000. From these meetings emerged several themes for exploration and some pressing needs. The two pressing needs were: (1) to identify and explore how indigenous Asia-Pacific traditions and perspectives can support the development of citizenship education, and particularly democratic citizenship education; and (2) to bring Asia-Pacific perspectives into the global dialogue on citizenship education. In order to begin addressing these needs, a smaller meeting convened in June 2001 in Hong Kong, specifically to develop a book around these two general issues.

This book is the result of these processes. It is best seen as one step in a rather long process of development, and best understood as a series of snapshots rather than an encyclopaedic effort. The authors were either participants in the process I have described, or were known to the participants. Sometimes dramatic events in countries of the region affected the list of participants even on the eve of meetings. Sadly, but for very good reasons, several exciting presentations made in ACCES sessions never made it into print. We hope that some day they will, but the publication of this book now is also important. We are aware that there may be gaps and omissions, and that we have yet to develop a language of discourse about these topics that is not essentially 'Western' in origin. At the same time within this collection of papers are very interesting sets of ideas, findings, and approaches that that go a long way towards meeting our initial goals of encouraging a dialogue within the region and sharing it internationally.

Overview of the Book

As an outcome of the process which I have described above, this book attempts to focus on conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education in the Asia-Pacific region that take into account local and indigenous context, traditions, knowledge, and values. Its purpose is not to discount Western liberal views of democracy and citizenship but to emphasise in a deliberate way that local knowledge and values inevitably influence the way citizens think about and act out their citizenship. The

Asia-Pacific region is itself diverse and rich when it comes to cultures, traditions, customs and world-views. This is evident in this book. As the chapters traverse different parts of the region they understandably portray views of citizenship and citizenship education that are, in themselves, diverse.

The book opens with three chapters that introduce the conceptual dialogue that sets a context for what follows. In the opening chapter, Kennedy outlines some of the basic fault lines in the conceptual debate. He queries whether there is a role for Western democratic values in non-Western countries and how these might match non-Western values to support Asian local values and cultures threatened by globalisation. After identifying three positions in the 'Asian Values' debates, he discusses the implications of these debates for civic education. In Chapter 2 Lee identifies the cultural features of Asia that may be relevant to understanding political and citizenship concerns among Asians with a particular focus on the meaning of the 'self' in an Asian context. Separating this concept of the self from Western notions of individualism, Lee examines the implications of the Asian focus on the development of the individual (individuality, not individualism) for citizenship development. In Chapter 3, we turn to how some of these same basic questions are addressed in a Muslim context. Fearnley-Sander, Muis and Gistituati raise the question of how a majority Muslim population thinks about state and citizenship in relationship to their religion. Through an exploration of the political and civic ideas of group of Muslim students and teachers of citizenship, they investigate the prospects for democracy in Indonesia, comparing ideas of the state and citizenship within and outside the Muslim tradition.

After the three opening conceptual chapters, the book turns to historical and policy studies of the development of citizenship education in societies across the region. In Chapter 4 Lee reports on the IEA civic education study in Hong Kong, drawing on interviews, textbook analyses, and student survey. He concludes by discussing challenges to citizenship education in Hong Kong related to issues of democracy, civic participation, attitudes towards the nation, and difficulties in implementing a civic education curriculum. In Chapter 5 Parmenter provides an overview of the historical context of the place of citizenship education in the Japanese curriculum. She describes the aims and content of the formal citizenship education curriculum, as well as informal citizenship education in everyday practice and the breadth of the school's remit in the wider society with regard to citizenship education. In Chapter 6 Liu explores civic education reform in Taiwan from 1980 to the present. She identifies two major trends that dominate the political and social context of Taiwanese society: globalisation and localisation, and analyses the paradigm shifts represented in three different curriculum frameworks. In Chapter 7 Gopinathan and Sharpe review the history of moral and social education programmes in Singapore in the context of its being a 'developmental state'. They then examine the adequacy of current curricular provision for civics and moral education and national education in Singapore in the light of the changing political and economic circumstances that the nation faces.

Chapters 8 through 11 raise provocative issues about the nature of citizenship education, challenging what are often commonly assumed perceptions in the West regarding the individual, state and society. In Chapter 8, Lee draws upon a cross-national study of values education that sought the views of mostly Asian elites on what values might be desirable for the next generation. He concludes that Asian education leaders regard the development of individuals as a top priority in values education, and discusses the implications of his findings for civil society in Asia. In Chapter 9 Fairbrother examines patriotism as an important facet of Chinese citizenship. In an empirical study at a Chinese middle school involving interviews with teachers and administrators, he examines teachers' perceptions of 'patriotic education' and the qualities of an ideal patriotic student. In Chapter 10, Mellor and Prior utilise data from a World Bank project that included extensive interviews, reviews of curricula and student essays, and school site visits to report on the impact of schools in promoting social tolerance and citizenship in two Pacific Island countries, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Using a six-dimensional model of citizenship as a framework for analysis, they conclude that local cultures, values, customs and aspirations were mostly in accord with the concepts of democracy and citizenship in their model. Chapter 11 looks at the relationship between history education and citizenship values in Malaysia. Based on an analysis of the curriculum framework and a student survey, Ahmad concludes that several factors have led to ineffectiveness of history education in promoting citizenship education, and offers suggestions for improving the situation.

While in a very real sense all the above chapters contain important elements of comparison, the next three are more specifically intra-regional country comparisons. In Chapter 12 in a cross-border study of perceptions, Grossman surveys what educators in the geographically proximate but politically and economically separate cities of Hong Kong and Guangzhou think are the ideal characteristics of future citizens. Despite the historical events that divide the two cities, he finds different emphases, but also a common tendency in both places to focus on the less political and controversial elements of citizenship education. In Chapter 13, Reed explores the continuing impact of Confucianism on current thinking and educational practice. Using China and South Korea as cases, she considers the efficacy of the revival of Confucian humanist discourse in China and Korea as a theme in citizenship education. She suggests that this revival could be facilitated in both countries by meshing Confucian humanism with the concept of 'multidimensional citizenship'. In Chapter 14, Roh addresses the nature of values education and how it should be implemented in a global information age. Analysing curriculum frameworks and recent curriculum reforms in Singapore and South Korea, she concludes that the prospects for values education contributing to social and political development are greater in the latter.

The two concluding chapters face the challenge of trying to draw common themes and generalisations from a rich and complex set of studies. In Chapter 15 Lee recounts some of the challenges in the task of identifying distinctively Asian elements of citizenship. Because of the nature of the application of Western concepts in Asian

contexts, the implementation of citizenship education is bound to face many tensions. Despite these tensions Lee identifies three features that can be quite distinctively Asian, namely, emphasis on harmony, spirituality and the development of individuality and the self.

In the concluding chapter Kennedy and Fairbrother cite three key fundamental questions that formed the conceptualisation of the book:

- What is distinctively Asian in terms of citizenship education in the region?
- What continues to be the role of Western models and values as part of citizenship education in the region?
- How are different societies trying to reconcile distinctively Asian versus Western models and values, both within their national boundaries and under pressure from globalisation?

Based on an analysis of the studies in this book, they draw out several emerging themes that will both contribute to and shape the future dialogue on citizenship education in the region.

No single book can resolve all the diverse issues and contradictions found within conceptions of citizenship and citizenship education in the Asia-Pacific region. However, it is our hope that this book can inform and enrich the growing dialogue on these concepts and issues.

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3

Muslim Views of Citizenship in Indonesia During Democratisation

Mary Fearnley-Sander, Isnarmi Muis and Nurhizrah Gistituati

The ending of the authoritarian New Order regime in Indonesia in 1998 was an opportunity for people to imagine a different state.[1] The 1999 free general elections created the first opportunity since the 1950s for a majority Muslim population to participate effectively in electoral politics as Muslims and to create their preferred state. Several large parties officially adopted Islam as their ideological basis in their documentation.[2] We know the outcome of the 1999 elections, which was that parties with a religious affiliation were not popular among the masses, who overwhelmingly voted for secular parties such as PDI-P and Golkar (Azra, 2000, pp. 310-314).

Knowing the outcomes is not to know or understand the way this majority Muslim population thinks about the state and about citizenship in relation to their religion.[3] To a large extent this is because of conflicting ways of understanding how

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[1] Suharto's New Order government replaced the Old Order regime of Sukarno in the coup of 1965. It built its concept of citizenship in the New Order in response to the perceived threats of social revolution that arose from Sukarno's policies of encouraging communism as a way of balancing the power of the army. New Order citizenship stressed the identity, rather than the conflict, of interests of all elements in society. It used as its vehicle the state philosophy of Pancasila, which had been formulated on Indonesian independence to generate unity in the new nation. It progressively developed the authoritarian potential of this Rousseauian idea of citizenship. New Order apologists promoted Indonesian citizenship as expressing the integration of the citizen with the will of the state, personified in its executive organ, the President. This coercive integralism would not survive the regime. It was objectionable particularly to political Muslims whose parties were obliged to submerge their identity in the identity of the state in the *asas tunggal* legislation of 1983. This legislation required all political parties and movements to adopt Pancasila as their official philosophy.

[2] PPP United Development Party; PBB Crescent and Star party; PK Justice Party

[3] Azyumardi sees proliferation of Muslim political parties in anticipation of the 1999 election as representing competing political interests, at most Islamic culture rather than an interest in the

committed Muslims relate to the political and the civic order in any historical situation and in the highly complicated situation of Indonesia in particular. This study sketches the ideational backdrop against which the choices of ordinary Muslim citizens were being made during the transition from authoritarian rule. It links this background with an exploration of the political and civic ideas of a group of Muslim students and teachers of citizenship at that time. Because of the connection with this moment of democracy for Indonesia, the study set out to understand what these ideas intimate about the prospects for Indonesia's democratisation insofar as they are suggestive of values and preferences that are to be found in Muslim contribution to the country's civil society. To do that required exploring how like or unlike their ideas on the state and on citizenship are to the ideas of democratic citizenship outside the Muslim tradition; and the extent to which their ideas are derived from religious premises and commitments. The reason for raising this inquiry is because of the debate in political and civic theory about the capaciousness of Islam for principles of democratic citizenship, particularly of the pluralist kind. In respect of Muslim traditions of civic thinking in Indonesia, this study does not have any of the expectations of deficit that may be implied in such a debate. It seeks to show Muslim implication in Indonesia's struggle with the competing principles of unity and diversity as potent for pluralist democratic citizenship as that of the different history of liberalism in the West.

The group selected for interview were chosen because of their involvement in making, or being made citizens, as subjects of the construction of national identities as well as religious ones. As well as being the first election free of regulation of the Muslim vote in the New Order, the 1999 election around which conversations with these students and their teachers were conducted was the first for these students as voters in what some of them described as 'the New Indonesia'. They were picked from the Minangkabau region of Sumatra, where Islam is '*adaik nan sabana adaik*' (*adat* [local custom] which is truly *adat*), that is, 'eternal principles guiding human spiritual and secular activities and from which actual practices and lesser values should emanate' (Taufik Abdullah, 1985; Hamka, 1984, p. 13). West Sumatra participates in a conflictual nationalist history as well. It represented the essential Outer Islands partnership with Java in the formation of a unitary Indonesia, expressed in the duumvirate of Sukarno and the Minangkabau Mohammad Hatta as President and Vice-President in the first years of the Republic. It provided four of the first five prime ministers of Indonesia. It also produced the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia in 1958, a rebellion against Jakarta caused by protest against the interlinked issues of the termination of liberal democracy, the defeat of Islamic values as the basis of the state and the violation of diversity by Jakarta's Javacentrism. It paid a heavy price during the remainder of the Sukarno years for its Muslim politics, and having learnt a lesson about strategy in the pursuit of regional interests, produced exemplary compliance under the integralist New Order (Amal, 1992, pp. 124-184).

revival of the idea of an Islamic state of 1950s (314). None of the parties had claimed during the campaign that they wish to replace Pancasila as the basis for the state.

The presentation of specifically Islamic concepts pertaining to citizenship in the definitional section of the chapter has also been put largely in Minangkabau hands in the person of Azyumardi Azra. Azra was one of the national *tokoh masyakarat* [community spokesmen] for the community thinking about citizenship and citizenship in 'the New Indonesia' and as such was also interviewed for this study. At the time he headed the State Institute for Islamic studies (IAIN) in Jakarta. He is an historian of Southeast Asian Islam and his political reputation and experience arise from political activism through his former chairmanship of the Muslim Students' Association (HMI) and through his political writing, which include several books on politics and Islam and many papers.

The study has three sections. The first outlines some of the constituent concepts and implications of citizenship and sets out the issues in identifying Islamic commitments to the nature of the state and the relationship of the citizen to it. This review is not intended to cover all the relevant concepts in the field of Islamic citizenship. The focus is on the profile of Islamic thinking in Indonesia at the threshold of democratisation which accounts for the salience of rights, opposition and difference in the discourse of citizenship. The second section describes the particular historical context defining the scope and influencing the interpretation of specifically Muslim political actions and ambitions in Indonesia. The third section presents an analysis of the ideas of the group studied, bringing out the way that their ideas are the product of a religious identity embedded in a particular national history.

Framing Islam and the State

One of the frames in which the relationship between Islam and citizenship continues to be thought about is whether Islam can differentiate human affairs into distinct domains of religious and non-religious life and obligation (Gellner, 1992; Lewis, 2002, pp. 96-117). The persistence of this conceptualisation of Islam causes surprise, given its monolithic view of Islam in the face of the plural forms of Muslim politics and polities in history and the world now (Hefner, 2000, p. 7; Turner, 2000, p. 30). Perhaps some of the reason for its persistence is that people are not always talking about the same kind of political consequence that might result from this alleged non-differentiation. Advocacy of an Islamic state is not a majority Muslim position in contemporary Indonesia, if we take Hassan's model of Pakistan as an Islamic state— that is, 'a state society based on the integration of Islam and the state, recognising in its constitution the sovereignty of Allah and the requirement that all law conform to the Quran and the Sunnah' (Hassan, 2000, pp. 2-5). There would, however, be many Indonesian Muslims, as Muslims elsewhere, for whom Islam is a complete social order (Hefner, 1998, p. 159). Yet the accomplishment of a complete social order is not politically neutral. It is not a differentiation of religious and non-religious life. But it is different from the idea of an Islamic state. Even the idea of 'cultural Islam', which emerged in Indonesia as a response to Suharto's depoliticised Islam and which Azra concluded was the form in which Islamisation had widespread acceptance in the 1999

election (Azra, 2000, p. 310)—even 'cultural Islam' is non-differentiating, depending on whether 'cultural' is defined as civic culture or as civil. The difference between the two is that one is a public culture sponsored by the state and the other the aggregated influence of private lifeworlds on norms and values in Indonesia.

The concept of secularisation allows us to be clearer about what it is reasonable to look for as the differentiation or non-differentiation of a religious sphere. Hefner describes secularisation as 'the processes whereby domains of social activity and human experience previously organised around religious norms are desacralised by their reinterpretation and reorganisation in terms of ideals of a less sacral nature' (Hefner, 1998, p. 148). On this definition we can say that non-differentiation is more than religion integrated with the institutions of the state. It is also the integration of Islam in the civic and public culture of the state. But a cultural Islam which is cultural in the sense of forming one of the lifeworld influences on civil society, would be differentiating, because it differentiates the business of the state from the business of religion and the realm of believers from that inhabited by non believers as well.

This issue is highly relevant to discussion of the idea of citizenship in a Muslim community because citizenship is a concept rooted in the idea of the secularity—in its etymology of 'this-worldliness'—of the state. The status of citizen relates specifically to fulfilment of this-worldly needs: rights, acceptance, and capacity for participation in public life (Turner, 2000, pp. 36-37). Furthermore the form of the state with which citizenship is still most identified in this age is the nation. So the processes realising rights, identity and participation add nationality to citizenship; citizens bear the temporal and contingent identity of the country they belong to.

There is also an another set of concepts in which that of citizenship is implicated, which is the constituent set of concepts of *democratic* polities, over and above desacralised ones. This set is organised around the companion ideas of sovereignty of the people and autonomy. In Azra's view a difficulty that the Muslim world has to confront in the development of what he calls 'a system of civil politics' turns on these concepts. Chiefly the problem he has in mind is the promotion, particularly by the imam in traditionalist Islam, of obedience rather than opposition (Azra, 1999, pp. 25-28). While acknowledging the embrace of Western concepts of opposition by modernist and liberal Muslims he writes that,

> in the established thinking and political traditions of Islam, opposition is not only pejorative but possibly in an essential way is anathema... In the system of political thought that developed in the Middle East treachery towards a system of politics means to oppose the will of God. In keeping with that in the conceptions and traditional politics of classical Islam in the Archipelago, insubordination is a sin not to be forgiven.

Azra thinks that a sustainable idea of opposition can nevertheless be nurtured within Islamic tradition, where it is not doctrinally forbidden. He links it with the Islamic idea of balance—in the field of politics meaning balance of power. But he

uses the experience of oppositional politics during the regime transition to distinguish between the idea of civil society as font and origins of democratic vigilance, and a view of democratic culture as equally fostered by government. Oppositional movements can in their own lawlessness and riot be themselves anti-democratic:

> A civil society is more than just pro-democracy movements. A civil society also refers to a society which ... is civil. Civility ensures tolerance, the readiness of everyone to be receptive to different political viewpoints and social attitudes. It means there is never only one principle, including in this, government and pro-democracy movements ... [that] force their own aspirations and desires either in the shape of cooption, regimentation or through riot, which only increases the cycle of lawlessness and social costs... (Azra, 1999, pp. 25-28)

This is a championing of pluralism, though not of Madisonian pluralism—the protection of the citizen against majoritarian tyranny by the existence of competing and antagonistic interests. It is more like the pluralism of deliberative democracy, and there are resonances of Islamic traditions of deliberative democracy in the model of pluralism as receptivity to different political viewpoints (Habermas, 1996). These resonances are with *syura* (consultation) and *musyawarah* (deliberation) as processes in traditional Islamic models of decision-making, with their goal of consensual or inclusive outcomes. But notwithstanding their potential for respecting differences of viewpoint, Azra sees these institutions in themselves as posing problems for a pluralist democracy. Azra draws on a tradition of critique of these institutions on the grounds that the results of them greatly depend on the will of power, because of the relativities of power among deliberators (Azra, 1999, p. 26).

Azra's position on civil society as a society of civility also implies that such a pluralism is not an unaided outcome of lifeworld diversity but a sponsored culture. Nevertheless in seeing the foreign-ness of the idea of opposition as a problem for developing 'a system of civil politics', he has perhaps in mind the liberal model of politics as the differentiation of the citizen from the state. Thus from the ground of political theory he is receptive to the general principle of differentiated spheres of life which may extend to religion also. The experience of the Rousseauian citizenship of the New Order— the integration of the citizen with the will of the state—in spite of its being the theoretical realisation of autonomy—would not be congenial to post-Suharto Indonesia, and particularly to Muslim Indonesians whose political parties were obliged to submerge their identity in the identity of the state in the *asas tunggal* legislation of 1983.

In championing pluralism also Azra is clearly aligning himself with politics supporting differentiation, and nowhere is the compatibility of Islam clearer than in its support for differentiated identities. Azra draws attention to the likeness of liberalism and the *madani* tradition of religious pluralism in Islamic polities. Using the word civil as if it were defined by pluralism he writes,

Essentially there is agreement that Islam supports the creation of civil
society. The Prophet Muhammad himself gave an actual example of what
that civil society would be shaped like, when he directed and led the city-
state of Medina. The evidence is not only in the constitution of Medina,
but also in the changing of the name from Yastrib to Medina, which has a
cognate meaning with madani. (Azra, 1999, p. 3)

By way of summary of the above discussion, Azra's discourse draws attention
to the clear presence of the idea of identity pluralism in the Islamic tradition and the
strong reasons Muslim Indonesians have for supporting the option of differentiating
the lives of citizens from the life of the state. The ideas that have been focussed on in
this discussion recur in the discourses of the students and the their teachers.

Relationships Between Islam and the State in Indonesia

What have Indonesian Muslims tried to make of their state? What have they
interpreted as their religious obligation in relation to the form and life of the state?
Has Islam influenced the culture of citizenship that has developed in Indonesia since
nationhood in 1945? How does that culture of citizenship compare to non-Muslim
sources of democratic citizenship in Indonesia? In this section those questions will be
addressed in outline to provide an interpretative frame of reference for discussion of
the views of the teachers and students in Section Three.

Indonesian Islam was shaped by the national history as well as shaping it in turn.
Probably the most critical factor in Indonesia's national history for the influence of
Islam in the life of the state was the selection of a particular ideological basis of the
state on independence; and the integrative use of that ideology by both Sukarno and
Suharto in the service of regime interests.

During the proceedings of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of
Independence in 1945 Indonesia became a Pancasila state. Pancasila refers to the
philosophy of the state incorporated into the preamble of the 1945 Constitution. Its
five principles are

1. Belief in the one and only God
2. A just and civilized humanity
3. The Unity of Indonesia
4. Democracy led by the wisdom of Deliberations among Representatives
5. Social Justice for the whole people of Indonesia

The imperative facing the independence leaders was creating national solidarity
out of the different societies, ethnicities, religions and economies that had only been
yoked together by Dutch colonisation; and rival political groupings in the struggle for
the political ideology of the independent state. The list of five principles is a masterly
subordination of competing identities and orientations to a new national identity. The

first *sila* was intended to avoid a secular state that would have been unacceptable to Muslim representatives and at the same time an Islamic religious identity that would have alienated the Christian and Hindu communities. The second, third, fourth and fifth *sila* eclectically assemble core ideas from nationalism, democracy, socialism and Islamic egalitarianism without further articulating Indonesia's relationship with these competing ideologies.

But for Sukarno, who takes credit for it, Pancasila constituted the creation of an authentic national personality, not a pragmatic list. It was masterly because of his successful indigenisation of it. This is well seen in the 'personality' of Indonesian democracy in the fourth *sila*. Democracy led by the wisdom of Deliberations among Representatives picks up two core ideas from Muslim practice in traditional contexts: *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *syura* (consultation). Deliberation to achieve consensus (with voting as a last resort) is the procedure of decision-making in Indonesia's Consultative Council (MPR), the Upper House of the legislature specified in the 1945 Constitution also drafted during the Independence Committee proceedings.

This choice of procedure was part of the development of the notion of Indonesian, or as it came to be called, Pancasila democracy as distinct from other 'foreign' democratic traditions. In particular it signified the development of Indonesian democracy as explicitly different from liberal democracy. Pancasila democracy expressed for the founding fathers an Hegelian model of the ideal relations between the citizen and the state: integration of the individual with the collective mind, represented by the state as 'the ordered, structured unity of the entire people' (Yamin, 1959, p. 111). The features of the 1945 Constitution (still Indonesia's constitution) implement this integrative philosophy in the extent to which executive, legislative and representative functions are undifferentiated.

There are three ways in which the selection of a Pancasila state has been significant for interpreting Indonesian Muslims' orientation to politics and citizenship. The first two of these concern the difficulties of identifying a distinctly Muslim view of citizenship from the successful indigenisation of Pancasila; and the third relates to the particular history of Indonesian Islam this century.

Pancasila as the indigenisation of the philosophy of the state entailed incurporation into the national political culture of the traditional Muslim communal institutions, such as *syura* and *musyawarah untuk mufakat* (deliberation for consensus). In respect of typologies of political practice, especially those which are opposite in orientation to liberal political practices, therefore, it is not possible to distinguish preferences for procedures which are Islamic or preferences for procedures which are Pancasilaist.

Also underlying Pancasila is a model of citizenship which is highly integralist rather than liberal. This political integralism was reinforced under the New Order by 20 years of political indoctrination and coercion through the vehicle of the regime interpretation of Pancasila, the Board to Promote Education Implementing the Guide to Pancasila (known for short as BP-7, from the seven words beginning with the letter 'p' in its Indonesian title). Its most egregious manifestation was the *asas tunggal*

legislation of 1983 which enforced Pancasila as the philosophical basis of all movements including Islamic ones. The avowed purpose of this and other acts forcing the amalgamation of political parties and proscribing mass politics was to eliminate the divisiveness of competing beliefs. Under this uniformising use of Pancasila the emphasis in the interpretation of the first *sila* moved from saving Indonesia from secularism, to enjoining the equal respect due to all religions. This usage ironically prepared the way for the counter-regime development of a Pancasila discourse of rights and tolerance associated with members of the neo-modernist movement as Suharto progressively indulged in the 1990s in sectarian politics (Uhlin, 1997). So the salience of Pancasila in the political socialisation of Indonesians presents us problematically with a political culture which can account for all persuasions on a integralist-liberal democratic continuum. Furthermore it makes it impossible to say whether an integralist disposition in Indonesian thinking about citizenship is attributable to Islamic integralist traditions or to the totalising ideology of the New Order regime.

The third way in which the Pancasila state has been significant for interpreting Indonesian Muslims' orientation to politics and citizenship is that it has imposed the terms on which Indonesian Muslims have had to pursue Islamic interests—the fact that it was a Pancasila state that Indonesia became and not a nation based on Islam. Representatives of Islamic interests resisted the formulation as unIslamic and finally extracted an agreement that the first *sila*—originally 'Belief in God'— would have added to it: 'with the obligation of adherents of Islam to be bound by *syariat'* [Islamic law]. This formula became known as the Jakarta Charter. But on the proclamation of Pancasila, this formulation was dropped. The first *sila* was changed to 'Belief in *One Almighty* God' to reflect *tauhid*—the theological stress on the unitariness of God in Islam. The frustration of this attempt to make Islamic law the law of the state was not forgotten and the restoration of the Jakarta Charter became the form of whatever has been meant by the Islamisation of the state in Indonesia.

The denial of the Jakarta Charter was also implicated in events which radically altered the career of democracy in the nation. It was a contributor to the 1958 rebellions against the central government in Sumatra and South Sulawesi led by army officers and Muslim politicians from Masyumi—of the two mass Muslim parties in the 1950s, the one more politically unyielding on linking Islam with the state (Amal, 1992, p. 56). These events resulted in the banning of Masyumi and the marginalisation of Islamic interests in politics in the remainder of the Sukarno period, contributing in this way to the deadly rivalry between the communists and the army up to 1965. The deadlocked debate over the Jakarta Charter in the Constituent Assembly elected to settle the Constitution and the basis of the state gave Sukarno an excuse to dismiss the Assembly in 1959 and replace parliamentary government with Guided Democracy. Suharto inherited the suspicion of Muslim party politics, retaining the ban on Masyumi. In 1973 he started the process of effacing religious identity in electoral politics. He forced all Muslim parties to amalgamate into a conglomerate party (the United Development Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) in spite of strong

antagonisms among them. In 1984 he required all parties and movements to take Pancasila as their ideological base.

There have been three main kinds of reaction among Muslim Indonesians to the choice between Pancasila and some sort of an Islamic identity recognition in the form of the state. At the source of these reactions and their plurality is a salient fact about Indonesian Islam in the 20th century. That fact is that it has been represented politically and socially by two mass organisations, their relationship mainly defined by opposition and antagonism. These two organisations are Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912 and (Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) founded in 1926. Muhammadiyah is the organised form of Islam that followed modernism, while NU represents traditionalist Islam.

Modernism is a reform movement in Islam that developed in the late-19th century. It is usually characterised by three features. Firstly it was intended as a purification of the faith from syncretist accretions. Secondly it fore-grounded the Islamic tradition of *ijtihad* (interpretation) over that of *taqlid* (unquestioning obedience to religious authority in Islamic jurisprudence). Barton likens it to Protestantism after the Reformation, conveying in the analogy modernist challenge to the authority of tradition with commitment to the divine inspiration of the Quran as the limits of its interpretative licence (Barton 1999, 45). So, thirdly, modernism is open to modern developments and to the modern world, seeing it as necessary for the progress of Islam and Muslims to take account of the differences between 20th and seventh-century contexts in the practice of the faith. Its modernity is instrumental, valuing modern technologies of scriptural study and particularly modern education. It is important to understand that modernism does not carry the connotations of secularism associated with modernity. Of the two organised expressions of Islam in Indonesia modernists are more associated with political goals of Islamisation—whether of the institutions of the state or the institutions of society—than the traditionalists. According to Barton it was mostly modernist Muslims who regarded the absence of Islam from the 1945 constitution as a betrayal of Islam (Barton, 1999, p. 49).

Traditionalists by contrast constitute Muslims for whom orthodoxy entails recognition of the primacy of the authority of the *ulama* (the religious scholars) in religious law; a more or less literalist recognition according to the affiliations of different *kiai* (Islamic teachers). Exaltation of the authority of religious teachers is derived from the *pesantren* (Quranic boarding school), the core religious institution of traditionalist Islam in Indonesia, organised around a religious teacher and his scholars. This localism has given traditionalism a non-systematic quality which makes it hard to characterise as a ideological movement, and which has also led to differences in what traditionalism stands for, which can change according to the incumbent leadership of the movement in the organisation with which it associated, Nahdlatul Ulama (Fealy, 1996, pp. 18-19).

What is the significance of this duality in the Indonesian Muslim community for the pursuit of Islamic forms of identity in the citizen and the state?

The first import of it has been that there has been difference between the two movements in the pursuit of such objectives. That difference has been most salient around the recognition of Pancasila. As we have seen in the 1950s, when the basis of the state was still in contention, the modernists' party Masyumi was destroyed by factors which included their position on Pancasila. Not so the traditionalists in their political response.

For interpreting the difference between the response of the two movements it is significant that this difference has had a conflicting representation in scholarship on the political history of Islam in Indonesia. It is not clear whether the difference should be categorised as one of political strategy and style in the pursuit of Islamic interests, or whether the difference is more fundamental division about the religious rightness of the Islamisation of the Indonesian state and culture.

Fealy, the main scholar of Nahdlatul Ulama, acknowledges that the traditionalists included some who supported the notion of an Islamic state and formal recognition of the Syariah in the Indonesian Constitution (Fealy, 1996, p. 19). However the account that Fealy gives of traditionalism, as expressed through the NU, consistently shows traditionalist Islam progressively being defined by its political stratagems, rather than the other way around. To use a broad brush, those political stratagems have been for securing the interests of Islamic institutions by political survival when that was the most productive, and by political withdrawal when accommodation with government threatened those interests.

Although yoked together as Masyumi (initially under the Japanese occupation) the two groups were bitter factional rivals in the period leading to the first general election in 1955. This resulted in NU abandoning Masyumi and entering politics as a party in its own right, leaving the modernists as the party identified with Masyumi. While Masyumi as a party did not survive political and religious opposition to Sukarno, NU refrained from ideological confrontation (Barton, 1996, p. 48). The terms of its participation entailed accepting the political values of Pancasila over those of Syariat law; collaboration with non-Muslim parties in Cabinets in preference to the solidarity with the modernists' party representing Muslims; preparedness (though there was leadership division here) to participate in extra parliamentary institutions in the setting up of both Guided Democracy; and *dwifungsi* (dual function—the right of the military to participate in the political and social realms as well as in defence) in the New Order. Ramage sees NU's withdrawal from politics in 1984 and the campaign 'to go back to its charter of 1926'—that is, return to a focus on social, educational and religious goals—as itself a political choice. It was a choice to give NU political space outside the formal political system, to critique the regime (Ramage, 1996, p. 234).

The picture thus developed of the mass organisation of NU is thus a picture of political pragmatism. Pragmatically at least, this mass party has been able to accommodate secularisation. In a political environment hostile to Islamic claims it sacrificed an abstract commitment to political Islamisation to secure the succour of religious institutions through a political presence instead.

But another view of NU is also possible. Equally consistent through the history of NU has been acceptance of Muslim life in a non-Islamic state and a non-Islamic civic culture. In this view the relationship of NU to Pancasila is crucial. Ramage has provided in his study of Abdurrahman Wahid's pro-Pancasila politics in the New Order some of the positive connections between NU and Pancasila as the ideological basis for the state. He points out Wahid's claim that his father as an NU leader helped Sukarno develop the five principles of Pancasila (Ramage, 1996, p. 230). He shows NU was the first mass organisation to accept Suharto's *asas tunggal* legislation precisely because it was an instrument of the non-confessionalisation of politics; a very different position from other Muslim activists, for whom this legislation was the suppression of Muslims' political voice. Ramage's interpretation of Wahid's withdrawal from politics in 1983 is that it was in part produced by Wahid's desire to criticise the regime interpretation of Pancasila. Wahid wanted Pancasila to stand for the promise of religious toleration and democratic pluralism implicit in its formulation and creation, instead of the increasingly fascist ideology that it had become in the regime's integralistic focus. Both Ramage and Uhlin focus in their study of Pancasila on the way that it was used by regime opponents in the 1990s to legitimate discourses of democracy and pluralism (Ramage, 1995; Uhlin, 1997).

A third reaction within Islam and Indonesia to the issue of recognition of Islam in the basis of the state is what has been variously called neo-modernist or liberal by Barton (1999) or civil Islam by Hefner (2000). Barton sees this group of thinkers as having such intra-group consistency of ideas and relationships as to form a distinct and new school in Islamic thinking in Indonesia. He defines neo-modernism as reflecting the further development of Islamic modernism where expertise and classical understanding come together with current methodologies of textual analysis (Barton, 1999, p. 5). In spite of its conceptual connections with modernism the school is much more associated with leaders and thinkers well-disposed to traditionalism and the NU; Abdurrahman Wahid is in fact one of its number. But the significance of their status as a school for our purposes is that their position on Islam and secularisation is unambiguous. They constitute a version of Islam in Indonesia which advocates that Islam not use politics or the state for furthering Islam.

The manifesto of this position was written by Nurcholish Madjid in his 1970 paper 'Islam Yes, Islamic Party, No?' In this and other writings Madjid asserts that so far from requiring an Islamic state, Quranic teaching runs counter to such projects. They violate the doctrine of the primacy of the oneness of God. The merely human must be desacralised so as not to detract from the oneness of God. In Madjid's words what is implied is *secularisation*, which is 'to make worldly such values that must have a worldly feature, and liberate the Muslim community from the tendency to make such values sacred' (cited in Uhlin, 1997, p. 75). This position does not of course minimise the importance of Islamic values in the life of Muslims. Pursuit of Islamic values would be through the institutions of civil society as with the civil role played by religion in countries like the United States.

The significance of this secularisation thesis for parallels between Islamic and non-Islamic types of democratic citizenship is that it removes any religious barriers to a liberal/pluralist civic culture in a majority Muslim state. It is because of this characteristic in combination with the persistent advocacy of liberal tolerance and pluralism by its protagonists that it has featured so strongly in studies of Indonesian discourses of democracy.

It is now time to see whether any of these affiliations are recognisable in the students and their teachers that contributed to this study.

Unity and Diversity in Discourses of Democratic Citizenship

In November 1998, six months after the fall of Suharto, the New Order institutions for regulating Indonesian socialisation into the state philosophy of Pancasila were abolished. Included in this abolition was the programme for implementing the integralist interpretation of Pancasila as expressing the indivisible identity of nation and citizen. Since that time and until the determination of a replacement curriculum framework in 2002, there was considerable debate among educators as to whether citizenship education should continue to be enculturation into a system of national values and identity, as it had been under the previous regime, or whether it should be replaced by an analytical and critical social scientific focus on political institutions and processes, more in keeping with the lesson learnt under authoritarian rule—the need to arm a citizenry against manipulation with the tools of institutional and social critique.

During that period of review and reconstruction we conducted an investigation into what this prospective citizenry and their educators thought about citizenship and the education of citizens for the newly democratising Indonesia. In particular we were interested in how our Muslim respondents viewed institutions and values associated with a liberal democracy, particularly pluralism, after experience of an integralist and authoritarian rule. From that study we have selected two vignettes—views of the students in two of the schools in the study; and views of their teachers. One of them is a top state school whose students will go on to the best of Indonesia's universities. The other is a state Muslim school. Many of these students will become teachers in mosque schools. Both sets of students are Muslim. The interest of comparing them is to see whether there is a difference in the outlook of the students from the school with the secular focus on academic honours and the school with an avowed religious purpose.

Firstly we turn briefly to the students. They were interviewed in focus groups and invited to discuss what had seemed of most significance to them the period since the fall of Suharto to the election of Abdurrahman Wahid as President of Indonesia. In both cases they focussed on the acquisition of the basic institutions of democracy: free elections, a free press, free expression—in short, freedom. In neither case did religion feature in the discussions, not even in the form of the possibility of taking advantage of this freedom for specifically Muslim interests. So the conversation is summarised

for what it showed about students' thinking in non-religious applications of liberalism and pluralism.

Both groups relished the arrival of multi-parties for the way that it allowed a plurality of interests to be pursued. At the same time they were unanimous about the importance of retaining Pancasila as the basis of the state. Democratisation created 'no issue' for them in that sphere. When asked how the continuance of Pancasila could be reconciled with the rights of plural identities, they thought such rights were accommodated by the second *sila* on Humanity.

These discussions in both cases led inevitably to the issue of the limits of freedom; and in the circumstances of Indonesia in 1999 the greatest concern that unlimited freedom presented for these students was the fear of the pursuit of territorial freedom and Indonesia's consequent disintegration. It is on this subject that differences in the discourse of the two groups emerged.

The discourse of the students of the state school on this topic could be described as a demythologised, social scientific approach to the issue. Their concern with the possibility of independence movements succeeding was mostly because of the way that poorer regions would be disadvantaged in such developments. West Sumatra fell into their category of the disadvantaged. Their understanding of the causes impelling regions to separation was mainly economic; and where it was through ethnic or religious tensions, these were the residue of specific histories rather than primordial conflicts.

There was one occasion however when the issue of the rights of minorities broke in: Aceh, with its longstanding bitter struggle against Jakarta for a separate religious identity. At the time of the interviews the issue was the demand for a referendum on independence. Aceh was a telling topic for seeing whether these West Sumatran students—in either group—had any collective memory of their own rebellion which like Aceh had been connected with religious aspirations. With the exception of one student who defended the protagonists of Acehnese freedom, these students all spoke as patriots. At the end of a long celebration of the new freedoms of press and opinion one student challenged her friends' assumptions about these freedoms. The test of whether the press delivered reliable information was how it represented people who were opposed to both the government and the preferences of the majority of the community. Her example was the representation of Aceh activists by the press:

> I want to contradict a little bit the opinions of my friends who said that the Indonesian press have made such progress, they're getting real information that's true. Is it really true? Because, the news connected with the problem of Aceh certainly isn't true, it's made up usually. For example up to now the people of Aceh have been struggling for freedom, but in the news they're made out to be bad. Why are they always rioting? In actual fact the party that's in the wrong is the government on account of DOM [the special military operation in Aceh]. They are always

arresting people... The military are doing lots of bad things there, they behave with impunity—kidnappings, rapes, disappearances. So that is why I say that the press really has not improved as my friends say it has. And I'll tell you one thing that the people of Aceh want, they don't want autonomy, they want freedom.

The speech received this 'colonial' response from one of the students:

It's well known that Aceh has suffered from the military crackdown. The result is that their education and development haven't gone ahead. It could even be said to be below the norm. This means that the present generation wouldn't be able to manage their independence. How could they manage their rich resources when their standards of education are below ours? And defend their small but rich territory. They'd be a target for being taken over by a neighbour and then Indonesia would be ruined.

Between them these two students manifested two strongly different responses to democratisation: one of them showing in her own bold advocacy of a cause unpopular among her friends how far the logic of freedom and rights and difference could be taken. The other student, on the contrary, displayed the resilience of the ideology and the interests of unity on the terms of the powerful. The students at the Muslim school also saw the issue through the ideology of unity but their discourse was significant for evoking the manufactured primordialism of the family state in the New Order. The responses of these two students were representative of the way the significance of a separation was seen:

Girl student:

I would be shocked and disoriented [if they separated] because for such a long time we have shared the same destiny and the same struggle and then they want to separate. I would grieve because it would be like losing family.

Boy student:

I would be very disappointed if they wanted independence because up to now we were one body, like a human body. If a limb of your body breaks off then you lose that function, and the rest of the body becomes unstable.

With the teachers we move back to the relationship between citizenship, religion and the state. Teachers' attitudes towards liberalism were elicited from questions about their views of Pancasila as the basis of the state and national identity, the multi-party system and deliberation for consensus as a form of decision-making. The

orientation of teachers differed at the two schools and the difference is best conveyed by two salient but representative exchanges. The first of these is taken from a discussion about national identity in the Muslim school:

Interviewer: What sort of political identity should you teach about? Should it be Pancasila?

Respondent: Pancasila ideology. Pancasila, Pancasila politics.

Interviewer: Is that more important than different identities for different groups?

Respondent: No. Our politics is based on Pancasila. If it were based on groups then that would mean dissension in our nation.

Interviewer: What about Islamic groups?

Respondent: In Pancasila we don't treat religion differently. All religions are considered the same in our country. If there were distinctions between religions then dissension could arise. This is something that ... that ... shouldn't happen in our country.

Interviewer: Do you agree with teaching Pancasila as the basic philosophy and identity of Indonesia?

Respondent: Yes. Pancasila is absolutely appropriate, because Pancasila ... because Pancasila is born from the crystallisation of the national soul of Indonesia. So Pancasila was born... Pancasila has been there for centuries. Truly. But after our nation came into being, then Pancasila was made into the basis of our state.

Striking in the response of this teacher in a Muslim school is the intactness of the New Order ideologisation of Pancasila, in the context of the permitted pursuit of Muslim identity and political interests through politics. The first *sila* takes precedence over Muslim interests and identities, and it is the New Order's interpretation of the first *sila* as religious equality at that. The indigenisation of Pancasila has been internalised: Pancasila should be the identity of Indonesians because it has been the essence of Indonesian-ness waiting there for centuries for the birth of the nation.

By contrast the response of the citizenship teacher at the state school to the New Order version of Pancasila was dominated by the *dissonance* he experienced as a citizenship teacher between his Pancasila task and his professional self-image as a teacher. During his interview he referred several times to the 'mental stress' that

citizenship teachers encountered as purveyors of accounts of reality contradicted by experience; and wryly referred to the name that the students had given such teachers at that school: 'Liar Teachers Number 1'. The following excerpt from a teacher at the state school is from a section of the interview where he was asked for comment on features of the New Order Pancasila curriculum:

> *Interviewer*: What was dropped? [from the interim curriculum that replaced the New Order curriculum]

> *Respondent*: An example of what was dropped was the role of the New Order, an example of the content was the idea of unanimity. Before it was used. Now it isn't any longer because it doesn't fit the way things are. It's not taught to the students.

> *Interviewer*: What's your view of that that? Do you agree with its being dropped?

> *Respondent*: With the situation like now ... content ... even the name of PPKN [Pancasila and Citizenship Education] has changed, changed to citizenship education. That covers everything but that's for these days. From the beginning we taught citizenship... Before the *reformasi* we ... there was this ... mental stress. Because what was seen in the field compared with what was taught didn't fit. With the arrival of *reformasi* we can more easily give examples again. So that's the differences between now and then.

> *Interviewer*: Here there are several concepts. Which do you think support the New Order, or perhaps you think that there aren't any that support it?

> *Respondent*: [Looking at the document] What's in the material, what's connected with the New Order is the idea of unanimity. After it it's mixed. Yes ... deliberation ... deliberation ... it's also important in there. Equal rights and responsibilities also. Now there is tolerance which is good. So with the situation now that's no longer suitable.

> *Interviewer* : So what's the problem with all that?

> *Respondent*: Well ... for unanimity, in Indonesia there is an element of deliberation for consensus, but with unanimity, it's like deliberation but coming from the outside, so the discussion is run by outside parties. So conditions for that aren't suitable any longer and ... usually we give ... this ... give content to the students about protest, because conditions are

different because the interests of the New Order... That's how it is. This ... this ... tolerance.

Interviewer: What's the issue there?

Respondent: Tolerance ... usually in ... for example in religious life, because it's guaranteed by our state, in ... this ... religious life political interests have got mixed up, have become all mixed up in it. For example a religion has got its own beliefs, it can't be mixed with other religions... But in the life of the state, we have to be able to work together ... in what relates to the state with people of different religion. So sometimes this is protested about by the students, conditions don't match up with what's practiced.

Interviewer: Can you give examples of where in the New Order in relation to tolerance it wasn't clear in the practice?

Respondent: A rich example is this, okay? An example in regard to tolerance ... an example with regard to women, okay. Women wear the scarf, okay. Because in religion, yes, in the religion of Islam that fits with our belief. It wasn't allowed ... it ... In this it stirred up trouble ... confused things ... the same thing with our own students. At work their faith also was made to accommodate ... their beliefs also were compromised, confused, ah ... this... What was the aim of the New Order? What ... we don't know whether it was to make us all one and the same or whether it was because of a particular political agenda, we don't know.

This excerpt has been provided in full because it puts neatly in review the different kind of ways in which the New Order ideology of Pancasila mapped out a civic identity inimical to the differentiation of the state and the citizen. However it is most interesting as an example of a thinker working out from the living experience what tolerance needs to be, to be tolerance. The teacher begins by reiterating the claim of tolerance made by the state and then denies its validity in practice—'political interests have got mixed up'. It is his understanding of the *liberal* basis of toleration that leads him to see that political interests have got mixed up. It is only insofar as people have to work together as members of the state that the state has a right to regulate in matters of religion. Clearly wearing the scarf does not impinge on the rights of other members of the state, but, on the contrary, being a matter of religious conviction, is a test case of religious freedom—of toleration—for Muslims.

It may be unreasonable to burden the responses of these two teachers with more significance than the difference of individuals. However the difference between them leaves two impressions relevant to the framing of the inquiry of this chapter around the implications of the traditions of Islam for citizenship. The first is their different

relationship to ideologisation itself. Even though the teacher in the Muslim school came from the one environment that was able to sustain an alternative identity to that of the state during the long years of the New Order, he gave no sign of restiveness under the all-subsuming identity of the state. Does this reflect the observations that Azra made about the habits of obedience in some Islamic pedagogical traditions? Does it reflect an orientation towards 'a complete social order' supported by the state?

This teacher did not challenge the solution of the statist identity to the claims of religious identity in a Muslim majority state. Does this give weight to the claims that Pancasila even in the indoctrinatory conduct of the New Order is a successfully indigenised source of pluralism in the Indonesian state? He did not, however, have the insight into the implications for pluralism of a statist identity that the teacher in the state school possessed—the realisation that tolerance means the freedom to express religious beliefs even when such expression might, by weight of numbers, seem a challenge to the commitment of the state to religious neutrality. The position of this teacher, then, resonates with one of the other positions on Islam and the state described in the preceding section, that is, the liberal tradition which sees Islam as well-served by its full and free expression within civil society.

How do these respondents connect with the contemporary understandings of the relationships of Islam with citizenship that we have seen sketched out by Azra and implied in the political thinking of organised Islam in Indonesia? In attempting to sketch some relationships between their thinking and their background, the significance of the democratising times in Indonesia should be born in mind. These were not times for theory—secularist or Islamic. They were times of the possibilities of real choices; and to that extent provide some kind of measure of the strength of influence of theoretical and historical backgrounds.

To draw conclusions then, it seems that all our respondents have learnt their discourse on citizenship from the state rather than from religion. The argument for Muslim identity in Indonesia is either from a Pancasila theory of diversity—expressed in the first *sila* of equal respect for all religions—as in the case of the teacher at the Muslim school; or from liberalism, as in the teacher from the state school. The dominance of the state discourse is consistent among the students, in the form of their enthusiasm for the traditional features of the democratic state. Where the state discourse is a salient choice is in the terms in which the issue of Aceh is discussed. The priorities of unitary nationhood have overwhelmed an Islamic perception of the struggle that the Acehnese are engaged in, for most students. Even the dissenter to this discourse chose the political language of democracy to make her pro-Acehnese argument—freedom and a free and fair press, rather than through the rightness of religious goals.

These respondents seem distant in their thinking from the terms in which Azra characterised the dilemmas in Islam for Muslims' conceptualisation of democratic citizenship. There was no evidence of any mental dissonance with the differentiating processes underway in Indonesia's *reformasi*—civil freedoms, constitutional amendments to improve separation of powers, discussions of regional autonomy for division

of powers. (The Aceh discussion included much endorsive discussion of the merits of regional autonomy.)

But one hesitates to describe all of the responses as 'secular'. The discourse of the students at the state school was highly secular. But both the teacher and the students at the Muslim school seemed to think sacrally of the ideology which has substituted for a Muslim hegemony in Indonesia. Their responses to issues of Muslim identity and to the unity and integrity of Indonesia were as if Pancasila was '*adat* which is truly *adat*' —'eternal principles guiding human spiritual and secular activities'.

Two questions are raised by such conclusions. The first is, does the preparation of citizens in Muslim institutions—whether schools or the institutions of the mass organisations in Indonesia—have a propensity to educate for a whole social order, whether statist or religious, uniting moral, social, emotional and religious life in their citizenship? The second is whether such a propensity, if it exists, is the result of the influence of Islam on Pancasila or the influence of Pancasila on Indonesian Muslims.

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